The Effects of Angle-of-Attack Indication on Aircraft Control in the Event of an Airspeed Indicator Malfunction by Boesser, Claas Tido
Dissertations and Theses 
7-2013 
The Effects of Angle-of-Attack Indication on Aircraft Control in the 
Event of an Airspeed Indicator Malfunction 
Claas Tido Boesser 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt 
 Part of the Aerospace Engineering Commons, and the Aviation Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Boesser, Claas Tido, "The Effects of Angle-of-Attack Indication on Aircraft Control in the Event of an 
Airspeed Indicator Malfunction" (2013). Dissertations and Theses. 24. 
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/24 
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
  
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATION ON AIRCRAFT CONTROL 
IN THE EVENT OF AN AIRSPEED INDICATOR MALFUNCTION 
 
 
by 
Claas Tido Boesser 
M.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Worldwide, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science in Human Factors and Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, FL 
Jul, 2013  

  iii 
ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Claas Tido Boesser 
Title:  THE EFFECTS OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATION ON AIRCRAFT  
  CONTROL IN THE EVENT OF AN AIRSPEED INDICATOR    
  MALFUNCTION 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Human Factors and Systems 
Year:  2013 
Analysis of accident data by the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation 
Safety Board, and other sources show that loss of control is the leading cause of aircraft 
accidents. Further evaluation of the data indicates that the majority of loss of control accidents 
are caused by the aircraft stalling. In response to these data, the Federal Aviation Administration 
and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee emphasize the importance of stall and angle-
of-attack awareness during flight. The high-profile crash of Air France Flight 447, in which 
pilots failed to recover from a self-induced stall, reinforced concerns over the need for improved 
stall and angle-of-attack awareness and reinvigorated interest in the debate over the effectiveness 
of angle-of-attack information displays. Further support for aerodynamic information in the form 
of an angle-of-attack indicator comes from core cognitive engineering principles. These 
principles argue for the provision of information about system functioning and dynamics as a 
means to ensure a human is always in position to recover a system when technology is unable. 
The purpose of this research was to empirically evaluate the importance of providing pilots with 
feedback about fundamental aircraft aerodynamics, especially during non-standard situations and 
unexpected disturbances. An experiment was conducted using a flight simulator to test the 
  iv 
effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack indication on aircraft control following an airspeed indicator 
malfunction on final approach. Participants flew a final approach with a target airspeed range of 
60 to 65 knots. Once participants slowed the aircraft for final approach, the airspeed indicator 
needle would be stuck at an indication of 70 knots. One group of participants flew the final 
approach with an angle-of-attack indicator while the other group lacked such an instrument. 
Examination of aircraft performance data along the final approach showed that, when confronted 
with a frozen airspeed indicator, pilots flying with an angle-of-attack indicator were producing 
less airspeed and glideslope deviation than pilots who were flying without an angle-of-attack 
indicator. Furthermore, in the absence of airspeed information, pilots with an angle-of-attack 
indicator were less prone to slow the aircraft to an airspeed at which the aural stall-warning 
activated. Overall, the results of this experiment provide support for making aerodynamic 
information available to the pilot, thus contributing empirical results to the aviation-safety debate 
over the effectiveness of angle-of-attack information displays. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human Error and Loss of Control Accidents 
With an increase in mechanical reliability of modern aircraft, human error is 
progressively more often at the center of attention in both the prevention and analysis stages of 
aviation accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Thus, in an effort to better support human 
operators performing their tasks, a considerable amount of research has been conducted 
addressing areas such as display design, pilot information requirements, pilot situation awareness 
(SA) requirements, and pilot-aircraft interaction (e.g., Endsley, 1993, 2001; Flach et al., 2003; 
Hameed & Sarter, 2009; Williams, 2002). Despite these continuous efforts, some of the worst 
accidents in aviation history involve perfectly flyable airplanes (with minor, recoverable 
mechanical problems; or no mechanical problems at all) crashing due to loss of control in flight, 
often caused by human error, or more specifically, improper flight control inputs by the pilot 
(e.g., Bureau de l’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile [BEA], 2012; 
National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2010; NTSB, 1975).  
In fact, loss of control in flight, either in the presence or the absence of a 
system/component failure or malfunction, is identified as the number one cause of fatal 
commercial jet fleet accidents from 2002 through 2011 (Boeing, 2012), as can be seen in Figure 
1. This trend is also evident in general aviation (GA). When the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) conducted a review of fatal general aviation accidents from 2001 to 2010, the majority of 
these were identified as loss of control accidents (GAJSC, 2012). 
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Figure 1. Worldwide commercial jet fleet fatalities from 2001 through 2010. Classified by type 
of event. Adapted from “Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide 
Operations 1959-2011” by Boeing, 2012, p. 22. 
 
Stall as the Leading Cause of Loss of Control 
Detailed analyses of loss of control accidents identified aerodynamic stall as the leading 
cause of such accidents. For example, an analysis performed by the NTSB of 20 transport-
category loss of control accidents from 1986 to 1996 revealed that the majority of those 
accidents were caused by the aircraft stalling (FAA, 2008). More recently, Lambregts, 
Nesemeier, Wilborn, and Newman (2008) analyzed 75 aircraft upset and loss of control 
accidents in airline operations from 1993 to 2007. They found aerodynamic stall to be the 
number one cause of these accidents and incidents. A summary of their data can be found in 
Table 1. 
 
  
3 
Table 1 
Summary of Upset and Loss of Control Events to Transport Airplanes 
Cause Number Fatalities 
Aerodynamic Stall 27 848 
Flight Control System 16 604 
Spatial Disorientation 8 630 
Contaminated Airfoil 8 200 
Atmospheric Disturbance 6 477 
Other 6 122 
Undetermined 4 380 
Total 75 3261 
 
Note. The data presents findings from Lambregts et al. (2008). 
 
 
 
Three examples of commercial airplane accidents in which the aircraft inadvertently 
entered a stalled condition and the aircrew failed to subsequently recover the aircraft from the 
self-induced stall are the crashes of Colgan Air Flight 3407 on approach to Buffalo Niagara 
International Airport on February 12, 2009 (NTSB, 2010); Northwest Airlines Flight 6231 
(NWA6231) while on a flight without passengers to move the aircraft to Buffalo, New York on 
December 1, 1974 (NTSB, 1975); and the crash of Air France (AF) Flight 447 over the Atlantic 
Ocean on June 1, 2009 (BAE, 2012).  
While detailed causes of the stalls often vary, it is assumed by the GAJSC (2012) that a 
significant contributing factor to a number of stall accidents may be a deficit in the pilot’s 
aerodynamic state awareness caused by limitations or gaps in aircraft instrumentation.  
Air France Flight 447 
 Past discussions about the possible benefits of angle-of-attack (AOA) information made 
accessible to the pilots (e.g., Forrest, 1969; Gee, Guidsick, & Enevoldson, 1971) have been 
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renewed after the accident of AF Flight 447 in 2009 (i.e., BAE, 2012; FAA, 2012; GAJSC, 
2012). The following is a quick synopsis of the accident of AF Flight 447 according to the final 
accident report published by the BAE (2012). The synopsis is not a complete summary of the 
report and does not touch on all aspects of the mishap, but rather focuses on the key points of the 
accident that are important for the purpose of this study. 
 AF Flight 447 was scheduled as a flight from Rio de Janeiro Galeao to Paris Charles de 
Gaulle airport on June 1, 2009. Over the Atlantic, about two hours into the flight, the airspeed 
indications became erroneous which led to the disconnection of the automatic systems including 
the autopilot and autothrottle. This was most likely caused by the obstruction of the airspeed 
sensors in an ice crystal environment because the airplane was passing through an area of bad 
weather. Numerous other failure indications began to develop as a result of faulty data input 
from the airspeed sensors to the air data computer of the aircraft. 
At the time of the accident, two copilots occupied the cockpit while the experienced 
captain was taking a rest. Upon being confronted with the disconnection of the automatic 
systems, combined with intermittent airspeed indications and other resulting failure indications, 
the two copilots could not bring the aircraft under control. Various inputs to the controls led to 
the aircraft exiting normal aerodynamic flight conditions in less than one minute after autopilot 
disconnection and the aircraft was subsequently allowed to enter a stall as a result of failed 
attempts to regain control. During this time, the captain was called back to the cockpit. The 
copilots were not successful in recovering the stall situation that the aircraft was in and could not 
give enough information to the captain concerning the state of the aircraft. Neither the copilots 
nor the captain subsequently seemed to be able to determine which information about the various 
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aircraft systems could be relied on. The stall warning was also unreliable, in part due to 
unreliable airspeed data that was being fed to the onboard computers. 
For the remainder of the flight, the aircraft was held in a fully stalled condition, 
descending towards the water from about 35,000 feet. Throughout the mishap sequence, the 
engines were fully functional as were the controls of the aircraft. The aircraft impacted the water 
with last recorded values of a vertical speed of -10,912 feet per minute, a ground speed of 107 
kts, and a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up. All persons on board the flight were killed in 
the accident. 
Increase Aerodynamic Awareness by Displaying AOA to the Pilot? 
Failure to recover from a self-induced stall, especially in the presence of aircraft 
malfunctions or other disturbances, has been the leading cause for two recent major accidents in 
commercial aviation (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010). In addition, stall accidents have historically 
been a leading cause of GA fatalities (e.g., Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA], n.d; 
GAJSC, 2012; Lambregts et al., 2008; NTSB, 1996; NTSB, 2011), and the FAA (2012) and 
GAJSC (2012) leave no doubt that stall awareness is currently one of the highest interest items 
when it comes to flight safety. Along the same lines, the FAA acknowledges the possible 
benefits of AOA indication in the cockpit and recently declared the installation of certain AOA 
systems in GA aircraft as minor alterations requiring only a logbook entry instead of a full-up 
installation approval process, thus facilitating the installation of such systems (Hirschman, 2012). 
Traditional stall warnings in GA aircraft, as well as instrumentation, generally lack the 
ability to show the influence of AOA on aerodynamics and only provide a warning when the 
aircraft is already very close to a stall. As noted earlier, improving aircraft instrumentation might 
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reduce the number of stall accidents by enhancing a pilot’s aerodynamic awareness (GAJSC, 
2012).  
Research Objectives 
Limited research has evaluated the overall effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA indication in 
GA. Forrest (1969) surveyed pilots with qualitative measures of effectiveness and did not find a 
difference in pilot performance of pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication versus pilots 
flying without in-cockpit AOA indication during normal flight operations. However, he 
acknowledges that the design of the study might have precluded discovering an effect. Gee et al. 
(1971) evaluated airspeed indication and AOA indication as aircraft control parameters and 
found that AOA indication is not necessarily superior to airspeed indication in all phases of 
flight. Furthermore, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of the approach-to-landing phase performed 
by Flach et al. (2003) led them to the conclusion that it might be more effective to focus on better 
integration of information displayed to pilots than to present AOA information in the cockpit as a 
separate critical variable. While they suggest that new displays should aim at better integration of 
aerodynamic information, no concrete examples of such displays are presented (Flach et al., 
2003). Interestingly, neither of these studies specifically examined areas of flight in which AOA 
indication is assumed to be most advantageous, namely non-standard situations and disturbance 
management.  
The purpose of the research described herein was to evaluate the importance of providing 
pilots with feedback about fundamental aircraft aerodynamics during non-standard situations and 
unexpected disturbances. Specifically, the purpose was to evaluate a pilot’s ability to fly a more 
stable approach with the usage of an AOA indicator than without in the event of an airspeed 
indicator malfunction. It was not the researcher’s intent to blame available display technology for 
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deficits in pilot aerodynamic awareness associated with stall; rather, the intent of the study was 
to evaluate how to support aerodynamic awareness. A secondary goal was to test a principle of 
cognitive systems engineering, according to which system dynamics and status must be 
communicated to the humans in the system if the humans are to help the system adapt, or be 
resilient in the face of challenging circumstances. 
Hypotheses 
In order to test the importance of providing pilots with feedback about AOA, pilots were 
confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction while flying a final approach. One group of 
pilots was flying with AOA information, whereas the other group lacked information about 
AOA. 
The overarching hypothesis was that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication would 
be able to better keep the aircraft within a prescribed flight envelope when confronted with an 
airspeed indicator malfunctions than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication. The 
derived hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to fly an overall more stable 
approach after being confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction than pilots without in-
cockpit AOA indication. 
H2: Pilots flying a final approach with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to notice a 
frozen airspeed indication earlier than pilots flying without AOA indication. 
Additionally examined was the frequency with which pilots in each condition allowed the 
aircraft to come close to a stall. 
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Limitations and Assumptions 
This study focused on GA pilots. For generalizability of the findings to the population of 
all GA pilots, it would have been desirable to draw a sample from a pool of all GA pilots. The 
fact that most of the participants received their flight training from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) might have been a limitation of the study; however, considering that the 
required piloting abilities for receiving a pilot’s license are the same for all FAA licenses, this 
limitation was considered negligible by the researcher. 
Another limitation was the usage of a flight simulator on a personal computer. The 
control yoke used for flight simulation on a personal computer does not adequately represent the 
forces that are acting on a control yoke in a real aircraft. In addition, other controls such as trim 
had to be operated by buttons on the control yoke in the absence of more realistic controls. 
Furthermore, a decision had to be made about which aircraft to use for simulation. It was decided 
to use a Cessna 172 aircraft because this aircraft is commonly used for flight training. The 
Cessna was equipped with standard instrumentation although, in recent years, more and more 
pilots are primarily trained in aircraft with technologically advanced instrumentation, or glass-
cockpits. Pilots primarily trained in glass-cockpits might have had difficulty adjusting to older 
forms of cockpit instrumentation, such as the round-dial analogue instruments used in the 
simulator. 
Due to time limitations, pilots were not trained to proficiency in flying with an AOA 
indicator. This has two implications for the study. One implication is that using pilots novice to 
AOA indicators for the study can provide information about how effectively an AOA indicator 
can be used as a backup instrument in case of airspeed indicator malfunctions even after only a 
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short training period. The other implication is that the findings of this study, if supportive of 
AOA information made accessible to the pilots, would be conservative. 
This experiment set out to use quantitative measures in order to assess effectiveness of in-
cockpit AOA indications. It was assumed that airspeed and glideslope deviations would provide 
the best insight into a pilot’s ability of flying a stable final approach. More specifically, airspeed 
and glideslope deviations were expected to be sensitive to a general decline in aircraft control on 
final approach. While other parameters such as lateral deviations on final approach, actual AOA, 
pitch angle, and various other measures can provide additional information, none of those were 
considered to be of the same level of importance as airspeed and glideslope deviations for 
measuring final approach control. 
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Definitions of Terms 
 Angle of Attack The measured angle between the chord line of an airfoil and the  
   relative wind (FAA, 2007b). 
 Chord Line  The chord line of an airfoil is “a straight line drawn through the  
   profile of the wing connecting the extremities of the leading edge  
   and trailing edge” (FAA, 2007b, p. 1). 
 Pilot’s Operating  
 Handbook  Operations manual for an aircraft, containing checklist, procedures, 
   limitations, amongst other information. Usually published by the  
   manufacturer of the aircraft. The military calls the operations  
   manual for an aircraft the “Dash One”, referring to the numerical  
   designation of the manual: “-1”. In this publication the term  
   “Pilot’s Operating Handbook” is used to encompass all operating  
   handbooks. 
 Stall   A loss of lift of an airfoil and an increase in drag occurring when  
   an aircraft is allowed to exceed an angle of attack greater than the  
   angle for maximum lift (FAA, 2007b). 
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List of Acronyms 
 AF   Air France 
 AGL   Above Ground Level 
 ANOVA  Analysis of Variance 
 AOA   Angle of Attack 
 AOPA   Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
 ATC   Air Traffic Control  
 BEA   Bureau de l’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de   
    l’aviation civile 
 CL   Coefficient of Lift  
 COCOM  Contextual Control Model 
 CSE   Cognitive Systems Engineering  
 CTA   Cognitive Task Analysis 
 ECOM   Extended Control Model 
 EID   Ecological Interface Design  
 ERAU   Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University  
 FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
 G   Units of Gravity 
 Gz   Vertical Component (Units of Gravity) 
 GA   General Aviation 
 GAJSC  General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
 GPS   Global Positioning System  
 JCS   Joint Cognitive System  
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 KDAB   Daytona Beach International Airport 
 MANOVA  Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
 MSL   Mean Sea Level 
 NTSB   National Transportation Safety Board  
 NWA   Northwest Airlines 
 PAPI   Precision Approach Path Indicator 
 POH   Pilot’s Operating Handbook 
 RMSE   Root-Mean-Square-Error 
 SA   Situation Awareness  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In modern aviation, the tasks the pilot has to perform can be categorized as aviating, 
navigating, communicating, and managing systems. The hierarchy in which those tasks are 
performed in has some flexibility, but usually those tasks are prioritized in the order in which 
they were just listed (Wickens, 2002). Nowadays, in most commercial aircraft cockpits, 
automation has taken over most of the aviating processes. As a result, it seems that the basic task 
of aviating, more specifically, keeping the aircraft in an aerodynamically stable condition, can 
pose a challenge when the aircrew is confronted with automation or other system failures and 
unexpected events (e.g., BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010). Once the aircraft departs from an 
aerodynamically stable condition, previous accidents show that the aircrew might be 
unsuccessful at recovering the aircraft back into a stable flight envelope (e.g., BAE, 2012; 
NTSB, 1975; NTSB, 2010). While arguably a multitude of factors can be identified as eventually 
leading to the failure to recover from a self-induced stall, one possibility is that aircraft 
instrumentation might be deficient in supplying the pilot with enough aerodynamic state 
awareness which, in turn, might lead to deficits in the pilots’ mental models about the 
interactions of aerodynamic forces, which sets the stage for improper recovery attempts from 
aerodynamic stalls.  
Background to Aerodynamics 
If you push the stick forward, the houses get bigger. If you pull the stick back, they get 
smaller. That is, unless you keep pulling the stick all the way back, then they get bigger 
again (Author unknown). 
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An explanation of the basic principles of aerodynamics relating to this research will help 
the reader understand the importance of aerodynamic state awareness and proposed display 
requirements that follow in later chapters. By no means is the following explanation of basic 
aerodynamic concepts meant to be comprehensive. The interested reader is encouraged to refer 
to the source documents (e.g., Langewiesche, 1972; see also FAA, 2004, 2007b, 2008) for a 
more complete explanation of aerodynamics. Definitions for the technical terms discussed in this 
section can be found in the Definitions of Terms section. 
 The lift equation. An introduction to aerodynamics usually begins with introducing the 
general equation of lift for any wing: 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡   = 𝐶!  ×   !  ×  !!!   ×  𝐴  .                                                    (1) 
where CL is the coefficient of lift, 𝜌 the density of the surrounding air, 𝑉 the velocity of the wing, 
and 𝐴 the wing area. For the purpose of this research, the coefficient of lift (CL) is certainly the 
most salient factor in the equation, and plays a central role in how much lift a wing creates at any 
time. While the other variables are certainly equally important, CL is mainly controlled by AOA, 
which is the focus of this research. Thus, understanding how  CL influences overall lift is 
important. Note that the higher the CL, the more lift can be created at a certain velocity and a 
certain altitude (the wing area is regarded as a constant here). Also note that with a CL of zero, it 
would be impossible to create lift. This short overview of the lift equation should help to 
understand the relationships between AOA, CL and overall lift, forming the basis for the 
following discussions. 
 Angle of attack. In his book Stick and rudder: An explanation of the art of flying, 
Langewiesche (1972) focuses his introduction on a concept that is very basic to the art of flying: 
AOA. He argues that while the concept of how lift is created, namely Bernouilli’s Theorem, is 
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often the main focus in the theory of flight and explanation of aerodynamics, the focus should be 
on AOA instead. In his words:  
It is the plane part of the airplane we have to understand. This plane is inclined so that as 
it moves through the air, it will meet the air at an angle and thus shove it downward, in 
somewhat the same way that the inclined plane of a snowplow, in moving forward 
against the snow, shoves the snow to the side. And the angle by which it is inclined, the 
angle at which it meets the air, is for every pilot the most important thing in flight: for 
that is the Angle of Attack. (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 10) 
Another fundamental point to understand is that the AOA is not the pitch angle of the 
aircraft measured from the horizon. In the easiest terms available, “the Angle of Attack is the 
angle at which the wing meets the air” (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 7). This air is often referred to as 
the relative wind. For a more precise definition, please refer to the Definitions of Terms section. 
The FAA’s (2004) Airplane Flying Handbook, designed as “a technical manual to introduce 
basic pilot skills and knowledge that are essential for piloting airplanes” (p. iii), provides a figure 
to explain AOA and its implications for overall lift (see Figure 2).  
As AOA increases, the CL produced by the airfoil usually increases linearly all the way 
up to a certain point. This point is called the “critical AOA”. At the critical AOA, the wing 
produces maximum lift (for a certain velocity, density, and wing area; refer back to Equation 1), 
but at the same time the airflow over the wing begins to separate from the upper surface. If the 
AOA is increased beyond the critical AOA, lift decreases and the wing is considered stalled. 
Eventually the airflow will completely detach from the upper surface of the wing, resulting in 
complete loss of lift.  
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Figure 2. Critical angle of attack and stall. Note: The degrees of AOA and coefficient of lift 
values specified in the picture are examples only. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying 
Handbook” by the Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 4-3. 
 
In summary, when the critical AOA of a wing is exceeded, lift will decrease (due to a 
decrease in CL; see Equation 1), drag will increase, and the wing will stall regardless of airplane 
speed or attitude (FAA, 2008). Pictures used to explain this phenomenon often use a horizontal 
line to depict the relative wind. While this depiction at first may not seem problematic, it often 
causes the reader to confuse the relative wind with the horizon line and AOA with pitch attitude. 
A clearer approach to showing the dynamics of AOA and the interactions is used by Flach et al. 
(2003), depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Relationships between AOA, centerline of the aircraft, and actual flight path. Adapted 
from “A Search for Meaning: A Case Study of the Approach-to-Landing” by Flach et al., 2003. 
 
 
Another way to look at the concept of AOA is that it is the “difference between where the 
airplane points and where (in the up-and-down sense) it goes” (Langewiesche, 1972, p. 11), 
depicted by the flight path and centerline of the aircraft in Figure 3.  
 The connection between load factor and AOA. It is essential, for an aerodynamic 
discussion of AOA, to mention the role of load factor. Load factor is a measure of the amount of 
acceleration being experienced by an airplane (or any object for that matter), which is usually 
quantified by comparing it to the acceleration due to gravity and expressed as units of gravity 
along the z-axis (Gz) when addressing the vertical component (FAA, 2008). This discussion will 
focus on a simple explanation of vertical load factor only (perpendicular to the floor of the 
airplane), because it operationally seems to be the most important factor when examining the 
dynamics of AOA. For a more detailed description, refer to FAA (2008). For a less technical 
description, see Langewiesche (1972). 
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An aircraft in level flight has a vertical load factor of 1.0 Gz (one times the acceleration 
due to gravity), which equates to the lift produced by the aircraft being equal to 1.0 times the 
weight of the aircraft. An increase in lift, achieved by pulling back on the yoke/stick of the 
aircraft, increases the load factor because essentially centrifugal forces are now acting on the 
aircraft. If one would increase the load factor to 2.0 Gz, the force created by the airplane would 
be twice the force of gravity and the aircraft’s flight path would become curved (FAA, 2008). An 
increase in load factor essentially is also an increase in weight of the aircraft. An aircraft at 2.0 
Gz, for example, weighs twice as much as an aircraft at 1.0 Gz.  
In a turn, lift has a vertical and a horizontal component because it is created perpendicular 
to an aircraft’s wings. To make up for the decrease in the vertical component due to the aircraft 
turning, an increase in overall lift (by increasing any of the variables of Equation 1 – usually the 
CL) is required to keep the vertical component of lift constant, thus maintaining level flight. 
During this maneuver, centrifugal forces act on the aircraft and the combined result is an increase 
in load factor. In a 60-degree bank turn, for example, 2.0 Gz are acting on the aircraft when 
maintaining level flight. An increase in AOA is necessary to generate the lift to support this load 
when trying to remain level. 
This relationship has major implications for flight. For instance, if a pilot is flying a turn 
to lineup with the runway for landing from a perpendicular position to the runway (called base-
turn-to-final; see Figure 4 for a graphical description of the maneuver), and initiates this turn too 
late, more than the usual amount of bank might be required to prevent the aircraft from 
overshooting the runway.  
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Figure 4. Turning from base leg to final. A maneuver often used by GA pilots to line up with the 
landing runway when flying in the traffic pattern. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying 
Handbook” by the Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 8-1. 
 
If the pilot were to use an excessive amount of bank (while still trying to maintain level 
flight or a standard descent to the runway), the load factor increases. Worst case, the AOA 
required to generate the lift to support this greater load factor might be beyond the critical AOA 
and the aircraft might stall. Frequently, pilots feel safe because they are at a relatively high 
airspeed but do not account for the increase in load factor and its impact on the AOA in such a 
situation. The FAA (2004), especially, warns about the risks of using extremely steep banks in 
final turns. In a worst-case scenario, if the aircraft is allowed to enter a stall close to the ground, 
altitude might be insufficient for recovery and the aircraft will crash. The list of crashes due to 
inadvertent stalls in final turns in GA is long. For examples of stalls in the final turn due to 
excessive bank and/or insufficient airspeed, see for instance: AOPA (n.d.), NTSB (1996), and 
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NTSB (2011). Factors such as becoming too fixated on the runway can also play a role by 
causing the cues for an impending stall to be missed. Especially when close to the ground, it is 
very important to recognize the conditions that might lead to a high AOA condition and thus, 
worst case, to a stall, so that such situations can be avoided.  
 The role of airspeed. To elaborate on the role of airspeed, a scenario will be presented to 
improve understanding. Assume that an aircraft is flying level at cruise airspeed and 
subsequently slows down. Any airspeed above the stall airspeed described in the Pilot’s 
Operating Handbook (POH) will work for this example (for details about the POH see the 
Definitions of Terms). When reducing the power and slowing the aircraft down, velocity of the 
wing decreases, which would lead to a decrease in overall lift (see Equation 1). In order to 
continue to maintain adequate lift to keep the aircraft flying level, the pilot can increase the CL 
by increasing the AOA (usually by pulling back on the stick/yoke), thus keeping the overall lift 
constant even though the velocity is decreased. If the aircraft is slowed further, the AOA needed 
to keep overall lift constant might increase up to the critical AOA, eventually exceeding the 
critical AOA, and the aircraft will enter a stall.  
The airspeed at which the aircraft exceeds the critical AOA varies by condition and 
configuration. For example, in the landing configuration, extending the flaps lowers the airspeed 
at which the aircraft will stall. At the most basic level, for single-engine GA aircraft, stall speeds 
listed in the POH for any particular aircraft are usually the stall speed in the clean configuration 
and the landing configuration. The landing configuration is often defined as a certain flap setting 
and landing gear extension, while the clean configuration is flaps and gear retracted (in aircraft 
with retractable landing gear). The main problem with relying on airspeeds is that airspeed does 
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not account for bank angle, load factor, or air density, to name just a few of the factors that might 
contribute to an aircraft exceeding the critical AOA. 
Aerodynamic Awareness Information Accessible to the Pilot 
 Despite the critical role of AOA in determining overall lift and the inherent danger of 
stalling the aircraft, AOA information is not directly available in many aircraft, including the 
Cessna 172, which is the most commonly used aircraft for primary flight training around the 
globe. The absence of AOA information in the cockpit, combined with the absence of AOA 
information in the POH of many training aircraft suggests that pilots may not adequately learn 
about AOA in primary flight training. Thus, other sources of aerodynamic state information have 
to be relied on and will now be discussed further. Because available information varies greatly 
between different aircraft, two of the most basic forms of aerodynamic information sources, 
found in numerous aircraft, will be discussed.  
Natural stall warning: buffet. While stall characteristics of aircraft depend heavily on 
aircraft design and shape and form of the wings, amongst other factors, most aircraft will 
experience airframe buffeting, caused by turbulent airflow over the wings as the air begins to 
separate from the wing. In some aircraft, this turbulent air will also reach the horizontal stabilizer 
of the aircraft, leading to amplified buffeting of the aircraft. One problem with this kind of 
“natural” stall warning is that it gives little or no indication of the situation developing prior to 
the airflow becoming turbulent. Another problem is that the amplitude of the buffet might vary 
tremendously from aircraft to aircraft, potentially resulting in failure to recognize the cue. And 
finally, during high-altitude operations, another form of airframe buffeting may occur, known as 
Mach tuck or Mach buffet (FAA, 2008). Mach buffet occurs when an aircraft is flown at or 
beyond its critical Mach number, which means a speed at which any part of a wing exceeds 
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Mach 1.0. In this case, a shock wave will begin to form on the wing and buffeting will occur. 
Under normal circumstances this speed is never reached, but in the case of pilot-induced loss of 
control at high-altitude, such an event might occur. On the other hand, because Mach buffet 
occurs at high airspeeds, an excessive airspeed or Mach number reading usually separates it 
easily from buffeting due to a stalled condition. In case of AF447, airspeed information was 
unreliable and was surrounded by other non-standard indications, so the aircrew might have 
initially suspected an overspeed condition and possible buffet due to Mach buffet at high-altitude 
early in the accident sequence (BEA, 2012). In case of Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 6231, 
the airspeed indicator was falsely indicating a much higher airspeed than the aircraft was actually 
at. The crew initially did not recognize the stalled condition of the aircraft, misinterpreting the 
airframe buffet as Mach buffet. When they finally recognized that the aircraft was in a stall, they 
did not apply the correct recovery procedures (NTSB, 1975). 
Artificial stall warning and stick shaker/pusher. Aircraft used in initial pilot training 
and GA, such as the Cessna 172 series, are usually fitted with stall warning systems that provide 
an aural warning to the pilot at 5-10 kts above stall speed in all configurations (Cessna, n.d.). In 
some cases, these warnings are augmented by a visual indication in the form of a warning light. 
The Cessna 172 series aircraft, for example, never display AOA information in the cockpit, 
unless they are retrofitted with an off-the-shelf system. 
Due to the fact that more sophisticated stall warning devices usually require input from 
multiple sensors of the aircraft, with those signals being processed by onboard computers, they 
have more parts within the system that can fail. This, in turn, might render the stall warning (or 
that particular stall warning system) inoperable, or it may become unreliable. 
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Toward Aerodynamic Awareness 
 Following the above review of real-world practicalities and evidence pointing to the 
potential value of AOA information, this discussion will now present pertinent areas of systems 
engineering and evaluate potential benefits of in-cockpit AOA indication as a means of 
providing fundamental information about system state and dynamics based on relevant research 
literature and theory. Initially, the focus will be on areas of systems engineering that 
acknowledge the relevance of human factors to their discipline in order to evaluate presentation 
of aerodynamic information to the pilot from a human factors perspective within the framework 
of engineering. In addition to information being presented, the operator has to be aware of the 
information, be able to understand it, and project its meaning and implications into the future. A 
discussion about SA and an evaluation of how to support awareness with design, within the 
context of providing fundamental aerodynamic information to the pilot, concludes this chapter.  
 Cognitive systems engineering. At the heart of supporting human performance within a 
system is an approach called cognitive systems engineering (CSE). This interdisciplinary 
approach is specifically concerned with cognitive functions such as “problem solving, judgment, 
decision making, attention, perception, and memory” (Roth, Patterson, & Mumaw, 2002, p. 2). 
Drawing from disciplines such as cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and computer 
science, the goal is to support human performance within a system (Roth et al., 2002). This is 
achieved by applying techniques and knowledge bases of cognitive psychology to the 
engineering process, an approach that takes systems engineering of the human-technology 
interface further than when just considering the human’s physical limitations (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 1983). CSE acknowledges the fact that the human is more than just an information-
processing system and that the strengths of human cognition, as well as limitations, have to be 
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taken into account (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Furthermore, CSE is a shift in paradigm from 
looking at the individual parts of a system as a decomposition of human and machine, to an 
approach that is interested in joint system performance (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). 
 The joint cognitive system. A Joint Cognitive System (JCS) approach to CSE considers 
the communication between the parts of a system and their interaction, but the main focus is on 
“understanding how the joint system performs and how it can achieve its goals and functions” 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 18). Figure 5 illustrates how a JCS maintains control over its 
processes by showing a cyclical model of steps necessary for controlled performance. 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of a JCS emphasizing the interdependency of different parts of a system. 
Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering” by 
Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005. 
 
Control theory in human performance. The JCS approach describes human system 
interaction in terms that matter in systems engineering – for example, feedback and control. The 
cyclical model, combining a feedback and feedforward loop, affects anticipation, as well as 
response (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). To conceptualize control and associated cognition within a 
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JCS, Hollnagel and Woods (2005) propose the contextual control model (COCOM). A COCOM 
differs from other models of control in that “actions are determined by the context rather than by 
an inherent sequential relation between them” (p. 144). Its primary features are four different 
control modes corresponding to characteristic differences in the orderliness or regularity of the 
context (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). According to Hollnagel and Woods (2005), those control 
modes are as follows: 
§ Scrambled control: 
The choice of the next action is random, based on blind trial-and-error 
performance. A reason for scrambled control might be that the situation 
assessment is deficient or paralyzed. For example, if critical information 
pertaining to a situation is not being received, this might result in scrambled 
control. 
§ Opportunistic control: 
The situation is not clearly understood or time is limited. Causes of such limited 
understanding can be “lack of competence, an unusual state of the environment, 
or detrimental working conditions” (p. 147). This leads to planning and 
anticipation being limited. Especially when the description of the situation used 
by the system to evaluate events and select actions is inadequate, choice of actions 
is often inefficient because delayed effects of such actions are not being 
considered.  
§ Tactical control:  
Performance more or less follows a known procedure or rule. In this mode, “the 
time horizon goes beyond the dominant needs of the present, but planning is of 
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limited scope or range…. The determination of whether an action was successful 
will take delayed effects into account” (p. 147). 
§ Strategic control: 
The time horizon goes beyond that of tactical control. The dominant features of 
the current situation have less influence on the choice of action and the JCS can 
look ahead at higher-level goals. 
Part of control is essentially the ability to compensate for disturbances and disruptions in 
a timely and effective manner (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Hollnagel and Woods (2005) state 
that the scrambled control mode is clearly the least efficient, and that normal human performance 
usually is likely to be a mixture of the opportunistic and tactical control modes, with the strategic 
control mode requiring so much effort that it cannot be continually sustained. 
Because of the fact that performance in a JCS takes effect on several layers of JCS 
control simultaneously, the Extended Control Model (ECOM) complements the COCOM. The 
ECOM accounts for the fact of simultaneous control of different types during different types of 
cognitive work (see Figure 6), where cognitive work within a system often consists of activities 
that can be described as tracking, regulating, monitoring, and targeting. 
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Figure 6. Different control loops and the interactions between them. Hollnagel and Woods 
(2005) acknowledge that these are proposed layers of performance and that the layers are 
changeable and extendable. Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of Cognitive 
Systems Engineering” by Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005. 
 
Of special interest for this discussion is the ECOM’s tracking loop because of its 
relevance to flight control. It is concerned with the control activities required to keep the system 
within predetermined boundaries or to return the system within boundaries should these have 
been exceeded. In addition, the monitoring layer is of particular interest because of an increase in 
automation on modern flight decks. Implications will now be further discussed. 
Humans give the system resilience. In a JCS such as a modern airliner, the tracking loop 
is often taken over by automation for a considerable portion of the flight. It follows that the 
major work of the human operator in such complex systems is performed largely in the 
monitoring layer and concerned with detecting and dealing with the unexpected events that 
might occur (Reason, 1990), a view also shared by Endsley (1997). She describes the human role 
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in complex systems as performing tasks that are not easily automated and concludes that the 
“human operator has usually remained to insure that the automated systems perform properly 
and to detect the occurrence of aberrant conditions” (Endsley, 1997, p. 200). In order to be 
considered resilient, a JCS has to be able to handle disruptions and variations that fall outside the 
normal adaptive capabilities of the system (Woods, 2006). Thus, if automation is not able to 
adapt to disruptions in the system; for example, due to sensor failure as was the case in the AF 
Flight 447 accident (BAE, 2012), or due to automation being unable to keep the system within 
predetermined boundaries (e.g., NTSB, 2010), the human can give the system resilience by 
detecting, reacting to and dealing with the unexpected events that might unfold, eventually 
returning the system to within boundaries. 
The new role of the pilot as being primarily a supervisory role above the automation in 
modern aircraft demands a departure from classical approaches to system design. Flach et al. 
(2003) state that with complex systems, such as aircraft, classical approaches to work design will 
not be effective because most of the procedural work aspects of those systems are automated. 
Essentially, to design for these systems, the goal is to design for understanding of the process 
being controlled so that the “operators can assemble the appropriate actions as required by the 
situation encountered” (Flach et al., 2003, p. 173). This is achieved by providing the operator 
with the information required for a deep understanding of the processes being controlled.  
Automation failure and the effects on the JCS. Whenever automation fails and the state 
that the system is in is not clearly understood by the operator, the system is likely to degrade to 
something close to opportunistic control. In this case, anticipation and planning will become 
limited. Even worse, if the operator is not able to assess the situation at all, control might be 
degraded to the scrambled control mode and actions taken by the operator will become random. 
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There will be a disparity between the actions taken in scrambled control mode, and the 
appropriate actions that are required to return the system to its predetermined boundaries.  
Usually automation does not just fail without reason but might not be able to cope with 
non-standard situations (e.g., BAE, 2012; NTSB, 2010). A disengagement of automation devices 
operating the tracking loop of the aircraft (autopilot and autothrottle) will prevent further 
adjustments within the tracking loop by automation, transferring control back to the operator. In 
a dynamic flying environment, adjustments are constantly needed to keep the aircraft in the 
desired state. In addition, margins for safety are small if an aircraft is close to its aerodynamic 
performance boundaries at the time of control authority transfer. If the operator is unaware of the 
aerodynamic state at the time of automation failure, or cannot quickly enough achieve such 
awareness, a breakdown in the tracking loop might occur, and degradation in the control mode of 
the JCS might ensue. Only awareness about the situation will provide the operator with the 
necessary means to reestablish control in situations where predetermined boundaries were exited. 
Consequences of not being able to return the aircraft to the desired state can be disastrous (e.g., 
BAE, 2012; NTSB, 2010) and underline the importance of supporting the operator in providing 
resilience by improving awareness in the human operator within a JCS.  
Situation awareness. In this section, definitions and concepts of SA will be presented. 
The most prominent definition is that of Endsley (1995), defining SA as “the perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 36). In Smith and Hancock 
(1995), the definition of SA revolves around “adaptive, externally directed consciousness” (p. 
137). They use the term “externally directed” to specify that the “goal of the behavior that SA 
directs must reside in the task environment rather than in the agent’s head.” (p. 139). Products of 
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SA, according to Smith and Hancock, are knowledge about and directed action within the 
environment.  
The concept and definitions of SA have sparked various debates. Flach (1995) suggests 
treating SA as a phenomenon description and specifically cautions against the concept possibly 
being considered a causal agent, as this might lead to circular reasoning and present an obstacle 
to productive research. As an example, he utilizes a statement that SA, or the loss thereof, is the 
leading cause of human error in military aviation mishaps and describes how it might be 
criticized as circular reasoning as follows: “How does one know that SA was lost? Because the 
human responded inappropriately. Why did the human respond inappropriately? Because SA was 
lost” (p. 151). On the other hand, considering SA as a phenomenon description would be to note 
that loss of SA is evident in many pilot errors. According to Flach, only when SA is considered a 
phenomenon description does it become very fruitful to research because it challenges 
researchers to go beyond simple standard laboratory paradigms in an attempt to recreate the 
dynamic, interactive complexity of natural task environments. 
Along the lines of Flach, who doubts the falsifiability and thus the theoretical validity and 
strength of the SA concept, Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) additionally criticize the concept of SA 
as relying on overgeneralization in the sense that the concept is often applied to situations that it 
was never meant to speak about. Wickens (2008), on the other hand, defends SA as a “viable and 
important construct” while acknowledging that it “still possesses some controversy over 
measurement issues” (p. 397) and predicts that the interest in how SA may degrade or can be 
supported will continue to grow into the future. He also specifically supports Endsley’s (1995) 
definition of SA, stating that it has stood the test of time, albeit a matter of 13 years. The focus of 
the following discussion will be on Endsley’s model of SA. 
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Endsley (1995) recognizes three different levels of SA. At the most basic level, Level 1, 
is perception of the elements in the environment; more specifically the perception of the status, 
attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment.  
Level 2 SA is achieved when the agent is able to form a holistic picture of the 
environment by incorporating the knowledge of level 1 SA elements into something meaningful, 
leading to a comprehension of the situation at hand.  
Finally, Endsley defines the highest level of SA (Level 3) as being able to project the 
future actions of the elements, with projection extending to at least the very near term. As a 
matter of consistent terminology, she distinguishes the term “situation awareness” as a 
knowledge state from the processes used to achieve SA, which she combines under the term 
“situation assessment”. 
In addition, Wickens (2008) states that knowledge structures, such as scripts, schemas, 
and expectancies contribute to understanding and comprehending the current state, while 
selective attention works to direct the acquisition of information. These elements of cognition 
(selective attention and knowledge structures) directly influence Level 1 and Level 2 SA, 
according to Wickens (2008). 
Decision making, goals, and performance. In a sense, decision making can be linked to 
SA but in Endsley’s theory they should not be coupled as parts of one process (Endsley, 2000). 
According to Endsley (2000), pilots can have perfect SA and make bad decisions, or can have 
low-levels of SA and still make the correct decisions, if purely by luck. Along the same lines, 
Wickens (2008) states that good SA is not indicative of good performance and further notes that 
“an operator with excellent SA of a failing system may not possess the knowledge of procedures 
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to remedy the failure or may not have the motor execution skills to implement that remedy” (p. 
398). 
While SA is seen as a construct separate from decision making and performance 
(Endsley, 1995), the goal of flight deck design should be to furnish the operator with information 
required for good SA in order to provide a solid basis for appropriate decisions. Figure 7 shows 
how Endsley (1995) links SA and decision making. 
 
Figure 7. Model of SA in dynamic decision making. Adapted from “Towards a theory of 
situation awareness in dynamic systems” by Endsley, 1995, p. 35 
 
Note in Figure 7 how individual factors, such as “abilities, experience, and training” contribute 
to the formation of SA and how “goals, objectives, and expectations” influence acquisition of 
SA, as well as the decision making process. 
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Smith and Hancock (1995) base their model of SA primarily on Neisser’s (1976) model 
of perception, which emphasizes the perception-action cycle, that is, the importance of active 
perception on the part of the user to make sense of a situation that the user is acting in. Their 
approach, like Endsley’s, also emphasizes the importance of goals. Smith and Hancock use the 
example of finding a car in a parking lot. For them, only if the goal is explicitly stated, can the 
quality of the performance be judged, and knowing what must be known in order to solve an 
information-processing problem constitutes the person’s SA (Smith & Hancock, 1995). 
Furthermore, Smith and Hancock define SA as “a generative process of knowledge 
creation” (p. 142), emphasizing that SA is more than merely a current snapshot of the agent’s 
mental model; rather, SA guides the process of knowledge modification. In their model, the 
knowledge that is created is called the “big picture” of the situation. Experienced personnel are 
often self-aware of the process of losing the big picture, which can happen when their big picture 
becomes insufficient to support the task (Smith & Hancock, 1995). One of the great advantages 
of the approach taken by Smith and Hancock is that such self-awareness is explained by stating 
that SA is not the agent’s big picture but rather it is the agent’s SA that builds the big picture.  
Regardless of the stance taken when defining the construct of SA, the discussed models 
have in common that external goals must exist, and eventually a decision (Endsley, 1995) or 
action (Smith and Hancock, 1995) will be taken, resulting in observable performance. The 
resulting performance can only be judged if the goals of the operator are known. To illustrate this 
point, if a person were observed walking around a parking lot, that person could be doing a 
number of things. For example, maybe the person is lost or maybe the person is looking for a car. 
Only if the goal (i.e. looking for a car) is known can the performance and SA at the task be 
judged. If a system has exited predetermined boundaries, and the operator is to return the system 
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to a predetermined state, the operator needs to actively construct knowledge-comprehension of 
the unfolding situation. Information displays about the state of the system will support the 
operator in doing so. 
 How to support “knowing what’s going on” using design. In general, it can be said 
that the desired state is for the operator to be in control of a system or process at all times. In 
most general terms, such a process could be flying the aircraft. Hollnagel and Woods (2005) 
identify a number of common conditions that can lead to loss of control. If the conditions that 
can cause loss of control are known, appropriate means to combat those conditions can be 
deduced. Figure 8 shows examples of loss of control causes and how control can be maintained 
or regained if lost.   
 
 
 
Figure 8. Determinants of control. Adapted from “Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of 
Cognitive Systems Engineering” by Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D.D, 2005. 
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At the center of being in control of a process is the knowledge of what will happen and 
what has happened (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). In essence this constitutes good SA that can be 
supported with adequate interface design. While different approaches to interface design exist, 
this section will introduce a theoretical framework called ecological interface design (EID; 
Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992).  
Ecological interface design. EID is aimed specifically at designing interfaces for 
complex human-machine systems, such as a JCS. One of the premises of EID is being able to 
provide a detailed symbolic description of an underlying process to the operator if needed for 
analytical problem solving, especially during unfamiliar events (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992). 
According to Vincente and Rasmussen, unfamiliar events can either be anticipated or 
unanticipated. They further state that unfamiliar but anticipated events occur infrequently, thus 
operators might have limited experience to rely on, but designers have most likely built means of 
coping with such events into the system. Unfamiliar and unanticipated events pose the biggest 
challenge to operators because operators are most likely unfamiliar with these events given their 
low probability of occurrence, and designers of the system did not anticipate the event (Vincente 
& Rasmussen, 1992).  
In unfamiliar and unanticipated events, for the human to be able to provide resilience, 
deep control of the system is needed. Operators cannot rely on a built in solution and have to 
improvise a solution themselves (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992). Such deep control “is guided by 
the operator’s mental model of the underlying process” (p. 596). Vincente and Rasmussen 
further elaborate that research has shown that humans have a tendency to prefer cognitive 
strategies that are less versus more effortful. Humans prefer to use established cue-response 
patterns and other cognitive shortcuts when possible. Preference for lower levels of cognitive 
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control makes it easy for operators to forget, and fail to consider, the underlying properties of the 
process that are not shown on the display (Vincente & Rasmussen, 1992).  
 Ecological interface design and situation awareness. Burns, Jamieson, Skraaning, Lau, 
and Kwok (2007) note that both the concepts of EID and SA “contribute to the development of 
information displays that improve operator insight into decision-making spaces” (p. 205). They 
go on to state that both concepts must, at practical levels, overlap. When considering the three 
levels of SA (Endsley, 1995), it becomes clear where those overlaps might be. Perception of the 
elements is the basis for Level 1 SA. A good EID will support Level 1 SA by providing the 
required information to control the process. In addition, Burns et al. (2007) point out that EID 
should support comprehension (Level 2 SA) by communicating the purposeful structure of the 
system; and conclude that it should support projection (Level 3 SA), by enabling operators to 
make assumptions on the future state of the system based on the mental model that is 
externalized by the ecological interface. 
Burns et al. (2007) designed displays according to EID for two sections of a nuclear 
power plant. Using six nuclear control room-operating crews as participants, they compared 
three different interface types, namely EID-based, traditional, and advanced displays. The 
traditional display was representative of contemporary displays for nuclear power plants. 
Advanced displays added trends and configural graphics to the traditional display. On the other 
hand, the EID-based interface provided information that was deemed important to support 
anomaly detection, decision making, and action under abnormal events. The control room-
operators were confronted with a total of six scenarios. Three of the scenarios were typical 
scenarios that the operators had faced before, and the other three were scenarios that the 
operators had never faced before. Burns et al. found that the ecological interface only provided 
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advantages over the two other displays when the crews were facing atypical situations. 
Ecological interfaces did not provide an advantage on SA measures during scenarios that the 
crews were used to. This led Burns et al. to the conclusion that supporting visual information for 
anomaly detection, decision making, and action under abnormal events might not help operators 
perform strictly procedural tasks. The real advantages of ecological interfaces might be only seen 
in unfamiliar and unanticipated events.  
 Cognitive task analysis. In order to design for systems that support human performance 
in cognitive functions such as problem solving, decision making, and attention, up-front analyses 
of the demands of the domain and requirements for effective JCS performance need to be 
conducted (Roth et al., 2002). CTA methods are methods used to perform those analyses and 
assess complex cognitive work. CTA is used to understand the “cognitive activities required of 
the … [JCS] and to fashion those requirements into a state that matches both the technical 
demands of the application and the operator’s functional characteristics in the cognitive domain” 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 1983, p. 592). CTA data can be collected by observing behavior of 
operators (in a simulator, for example), studying work artifacts, and using semi-structured 
interviews, as examples. Using the data from these sources, processes can be mapped out in 
schematic or hierarchical representations to provide the basis for engineering that supports 
cognitive work in a given work domain. 
Task analysis has been used to evaluate possible benefits of in-cockpit AOA indications. 
Flach et al. (2003) wondered if making the AOA explicit in the cockpit could not only lead to the 
prevention of stalls but also to a general enhancement of piloting capabilities. They observed 
pilot participants in a synthetic task environment flying a final approach to landing. When they 
broke down the task into a schematic diagram assessing the couplings between control inputs to 
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the aircraft and performance indices, they noticed that the AOA was at a central position in the 
diagram. Consequently, they acknowledge the tight coupling of AOA to the piloting task.  
Summary 
 In the previous sections, a mix of design philosophies, strategies for design, and strategies 
for assessing the work and determining what information and relationships need to be shown to 
operators, have been discussed. All of these philosophies, strategies, and methods center around 
the premise that system designs must effectively interface the human and technology 
components of a system. In a complex system, knowledge of system state is vital so that an 
operator can manage the system appropriately, detect problems early, take over at any given time 
if automation fails, and handle abnormal situations adequately. A well-designed interface will 
facilitate understanding the dynamics of flight and effectively communicate the state of the 
system.  
By making AOA explicit to pilots, it can be used for problem solving and 
troubleshooting. Displaying AOA provides observability of the aerodynamic state and feedback 
that provides insight into the dynamic nature of how control inputs by the operator change this 
aerodynamic state, one of the support requirements for cognitive work listed by Woods (2005). 
In addition, Woods (2005) lists support for resilience as a requirement for cognitive work, with 
cross checks as possible means to avoid premature narrowing and related vulnerabilities in 
cognitive work. Overt AOA supports resilience by providing direct feedback to changes in 
aerodynamic state and also provide means for cross check, especially if the validity of another 
source of information (i.e. airspeed information) is questioned. Being able to assess AOA 
information directly facilitates assessing the aerodynamic state, rather than having to integrate 
information from various sources (i.e. airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, attitude 
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indicator). There is no need to integrate individual elements in order to make a higher order 
assessment, or more precisely, in order to evaluate the aerodynamic state, thus facilitating 
situation awareness and aerodynamic awareness. As such, AOA can be seen as an overall 
aerodynamic state indicator providing a clear description of the underlying process. In addition, 
understanding the concepts of AOA might require AOA to be more than an abstract concept. If 
AOA information is made accessible to the pilot it will facilitate understanding and visualization 
of the “dynamics” in aerodynamics, which should positively influence the flexibility of response 
required in non-standard situations.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-four pilots recruited from ERAU participated in the experiment. Two of the 
participants produced unusable data due to technical simulator difficulties and were replaced by 
two additional participants. Any previous experience flying with in-cockpit AOA indication was 
an exclusion criterion for the study. Pilots were required to hold at least a private pilot certificate 
and were required to have a minimum of 200 total flight hours to ensure familiarity with standard 
piloting procedures. They were equally split by random assignment into two groups, namely an 
AOA and No-AOA group. The average age of participants in the AOA condition was 24.44 
years (SD = 4.59). In the No-AOA condition, the average age was 21.12 years (SD = 1.86). The 
average flight hours for participants in the AOA condition were 1114.69 hours (SD = 1528.6, 
Mdn = 285), and 368 hours (SD = 209.28, Mdn = 297.5) in the No-AOA condition. The 
relatively large discrepancy in flight hours between the two conditions is further addressed in the 
Results chapter. 
Participants received an incentive of $20 after participating. The experiment consisted of 
a single session, which did not exceed one hour in duration. Participants were required to sign a 
consent form (see Appendix B) and informed that they could end their participation in the 
experiment at any time and would be paid for the time they have already completed. In addition, 
demographic information was collected from the participants. The collected information 
included age, total flight hours, and certificates held. See Appendix C for a complete listing of 
demographic information requested. All data collected during the experiment is kept 
confidential. 
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Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted with the use of X-Plane 9 flight simulation software 
created by Laminar Research. The software ran on a Windows desktop computer with a 22-in 
computer screen providing a full-screen view of the aircraft instrument panel and a forward view 
from the pilot’s perspective. A yoke and throttle were used as flight controls allowing 
participants to interface with the flight simulator. The flight simulation software was used to 
simulate a Cessna 172 aircraft, a common initial flight training aircraft that the participants 
should have been familiar with. The Cessna 172 was equipped with analogue instrumentation 
and lacked a GPS so as to not provide redundant airspeed information. On trials featuring AOA 
information, an AOA indicator was displayed on top of the aircraft’s dashboard, to the left and 
within the pilot’s outside field of view, a standard position for popular off-the-shelf GA aircraft 
AOA indexers (Hirschman, 2012; see also Figure 9). Participants were given the opportunity to 
familiarize themselves with the aircraft and instrumentation during practice trials before the 
beginning of the experiment. 
The AOA indexer used in this experiment was a cue-based AOA indexer (see Figure 9) 
and consisted of three symbols calibrated to show optimum AOA for the approach-to-landing 
phase and deviations from optimum AOA. For a no-flap final approach, the optimum AOA was 
achieved when the aircraft was flown between 60 to 65 kts. 
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Figure 9. A cue-based AOA indicator or indexer. The indicator is situated on top of the aircraft’s 
dashboard, slightly to the left off-center and within the pilot’s outside field of view. Note that in 
this picture the AOA is slightly lower than optimum AOA. Screenshot taken from X-Plane by 
Laminar Research. 
 
The three cues used to show AOA were a green donut, a yellow upward pointing 
chevron, and a red downward pointing chevron. The green donut in the middle of the instrument 
illuminates if the aircraft is flying at optimum AOA for the approach. The yellow upward 
pointing chevron on the bottom of the indexer illuminates if the AOA is lower than the optimum 
approach AOA. A red downward pointing chevron on the top of the indexer (not illuminated in 
Figure 9) illuminates if the AOA is higher than the optimum approach AOA. Combinations of 
on-speed and either the upward or downward pointing chevron are possible to show smooth 
transitions between optimum AOA and either lower than optimum or higher than optimum AOA. 
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The flight simulator used for this study was located in a dedicated research facility and 
flanked on either side by cloth dividers. No other activity took place in the facility during the 
conduct of this experiment.  
A software plugin developed by a software engineering student, Matthew Grasso, from 
ERAU was used to record research-critical flight parameters throughout the experiment. 
Specifically, the software plugin recorded, among other values, the indicated airspeed of the 
aircraft, glideslope deviations, the activation of the stall warning during flight, and whether a 
button on the yoke was pressed. The flight data was recorded at a rate of 5 times per second and 
automatically saved to an Excel file. An excerpt of such a data-file can be found in Appendix G. 
In addition, the plugin automatically failed the airspeed indicator to a frozen position once the 
airspeed decreased to 70 kts. 
Experimental Design 
The experiment was a two-level between subjects design (No-AOA versus AOA). The 
dependent variables were: approach speed deviation, glideslope deviation, time until airspeed 
indicator malfunction was noticed, whether and how often the stall warning horn activated 
during flight, and correct identification of the malfunction. 
Participants in the No-AOA condition flew practice and experimental trials without the 
addition of an AOA indicator, whereas pilots in the AOA condition flew practice and 
experimental trials with an AOA indicator added to the instrumentation. The required sample 
size of 32 participants for such a design with two outcome variables was calculated a priori using 
a statistical power analysis program called G*Power Version 3.1.6 from the Heinrich Heine 
Institute for Experimental Psychology at the University of Duesseldorf, Germany (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Specifically, the required sample size was calculated for an 
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F-Test Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) using α = .05, power (1-β) = .8, and an 
effect size of f2 = 0.35. It was assumed that the experimental interventions in this study would 
produce a large effect which Cohen (1988) assumes to be f2 = 0.35. The statistical power of .8 
was chosen as a trade-off between feasible sample-size and statistical power. 
Pilot Testing 
Pilot testing was performed with two volunteer pilots from ERAU to optimize the flow of 
the experiment and to determine how many practice and experimental trials should be flown to 
provide a balance between adequate training and possible boredom effects. Furthermore, it was 
necessary to evaluate the airspeed indicator malfunction in terms of its detectability, and 
dependent variable sensitivity. In addition, the software plugin was tested and validated.  
Initially, it was planned to have participants fly 10 practice approaches and four 
experimental trials. During pilot testing it was determined that the 14 planned approaches were 
too many as sloppiness was observed due to boredom and complacency effects. The total number 
of approaches was cut down to a total of eight approaches, namely six practice and two 
experimental trials. The pilot tests were used to evaluate the initial approach parameters for 
setting up the aircraft along the approach path. The resulting setup that was deemed adequate for 
the experiment is described in the next paragraph.  
Procedure 
The researcher followed an experiment script (shown in Appendix E) to standardize the 
conduct of the experiment. Participants were welcomed to the study and asked to read and sign 
the consent form (see Appendix B). Demographic information was collected using the 
questionnaire in Appendix C. They were informed that this experiment is “concerned with 
examining possible advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack indications during flight”. 
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In addition, they were told that it is of utmost importance that they do not talk to their friends or 
colleagues about the events experienced during the experiment. This was done to prevent 
incoming participants from being prepared for an airspeed indicator malfunction. Incoming 
participants were asked if they had heard anything about the exact nature of the experiment.  
The task. The pilots’ task was to conduct final approaches to Runway 34 at Daytona 
Beach International Airport (KDAB). All approaches were set up on a 3 nm final, along the 
runway centerline, on glideslope, corresponding to at an altitude of 1000 ft MSL. The initial 
airspeed for the setup was 90 kts. 
Participants were instructed to maintain a 3° glideslope during the descent towards the 
runway. Furthermore, participants were instructed to slowdown to between 60-65 kts as quickly 
as possible and to fly a no-flap final approach. An aid to visualization of the proper glideslope 
was provided in form of a precision approach path indicator (PAPI; an array of four lights 
usually situated to the side of a runway showing glideslope deviations to the pilot) situated to the 
left of the runway and calibrated for a 3° glideslope. Participants were required to aim for a 
touchdown 1000 ft beyond the runway threshold because this aiming point is consistent with the 
alignment of the PAPI. They were informed that transition to landing was neither required nor 
desired. This was done in an effort to produce usable data for the entire approach and to not skew 
the results. Any early transition to landing would have impacted the glideslope and airspeed 
deviation data. The simulation froze prior to the aircraft touching down. Upon simulation freeze, 
the aircraft was reset to the starting point of the approach. 
Training. Before the experiment began, participants in the AOA group were instructed 
on the usage of an AOA indicator for flight. This training session lasted about 15 minutes. 
PowerPoint slides from this introduction are provided in Appendix F. Specifically the concept of 
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AOA was reiterated and the symbology of the AOA indicator explained. Some participants had 
misconceptions about AOA that had to be corrected during training. These misconceptions are 
further discussed in the Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations chapter. 
Practice trials. In the first six trials, pilots flew practice approaches, one per trial, to 
familiarize participants with the aircraft, the controls of the aircraft, and the general task. They 
featured a 10-kt headwind and clear skies. There were no malfunctions or wind speed changes 
during these approaches. 
Pilots in the AOA condition were instructed on the correct usage of the AOA indexer as a 
means of crosschecking final approach speeds. For the first three approaches, participants in the 
AOA group were further instructed to induce airspeed deviations to develop an understanding of 
how the AOA indexer works and how it can be useful in detecting anomalies during final 
approach. In order to provide consistency for pilots in both conditions, during the first three 
approaches, the No-AOA group was also instructed to explore a range of airspeeds on final. 
 Following the first three approaches, participants flew three additional approaches. For 
those additional approaches, they were told to focus on flying stable approaches and to minimize 
glideslope, horizontal, and airspeed deviations. After the practice approaches, experimental trials 
began. 
Experimental trials. At the beginning of the experiment trials, participants were told that 
they would encounter different initial headwind conditions and a possible aircraft malfunction 
over the next set of trials. Before each experimental trial, the participant was asked to identify 
any suspected aircraft malfunction as soon as he or she detected it by pressing a button on the 
control yoke. The time at which the pilot pressed the button to indicate a suspected malfunction 
was recorded. Participants were instructed that their task would be to deal with the different 
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headwind situations and the possible malfunction while still striving to accomplish a stabilized 
approach. Pilots were informed that discontinuing the approach, although certainly an option in a 
real-life scenario, would not be a valid option for the purpose of this experiment.  
Participants were not told during which trial the malfunction would occur, nor did they 
know how many experimental trials they were facing. A total of two experimental trials were 
performed. The first trial included a steady headwind of 30 kts, whereas the second trial included 
a headwind at 25 kts and an airspeed indicator malfunction. While the participant slowed to final 
approach speed, the airspeed indicator failed automatically when the aircraft’s airspeed passed 
through 70 kts. Failure of the airspeed indicator was simulated by a frozen indication of airspeed. 
During all trials, if the aircraft would get too close to a stall, the sound off a stall warning 
horn would activate. The times at which the stall warning horn activated during flight were 
recorded. Furthermore, at the end of each experimental trial, the participant was asked if any 
malfunction was present during final approach. Answers from the experimental trial that 
included the airspeed indicator malfunction were scored as “1” if the participant correctly 
identified the airspeed indicator malfunction and as “0” if the participant did not suspect any 
malfunction or identified the malfunction as being of a different kind.  
Data Processing 
Data collected from the second trial were used in the data analysis. Deviations from 
glideslope and airspeed indications were measured at 5-second intervals throughout the 
approach. The data used for glideslope and airspeed analysis in this study were taken from the 
point along the approach at which the aircraft passed through 500 ft above ground level (AGL) to 
the point at which the aircraft passed through 100 ft AGL. The main underlying reason for using 
the described range of data is that the FAA (2007a) states that an aircraft should be stabilized on 
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a final approach before descending through an altitude of 500 ft AGL in visual meteorological 
conditions (i.e., simplified, conditions that allow for being able to see the runway during the 
entire approach). Descending through the last 100 ft AGL of the approach, the participant might 
already have started a transition to landing, although told not to do so. This was observed in trials 
and most likely occurred due to personal habits that the participant might have acquired during 
their flying career. The resulting data range will be referred to as “final approach data” for the 
remainder of this document and measures taken during the experiment will now be discussed in 
more detail. 
 Airspeed and glideslope deviation. Airspeed deviation was calculated as the root-mean-
square-error (RMSE) of all airspeeds that fell outside the prescribed range of 60 to 65 kts. In 
addition, glideslope deviation was calculated as the RMSE of deviations that fell outside of the 
PAPI on-glideslope indication. More specifically, PAPIs have an allowable range for which they 
show an “on 3° glideslope” indication. This is indicated by the PAPI showing two white and two 
red lights. Thus, the actual glideslope will be between an upper-boundary of 3.21° and a lower-
boundary of 2.81° while the PAPI shows an on-glideslope indication. Upper and lower 
boundaries were calculated by Lloyd (2012) for a PAPI system modeled in X-Plane and might 
differ outside of the simulation. Refer to Figure 10 for a graphical representation. Deviations (in 
feet) outside of the upper and lower limit of the on-glideslope indication were recorded and the 
RMSE of such deviations calculated for each participant. 
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Figure 10. Upper and lower PAPI boundaries with respective PAPI indications. Adapted from 
“The Effect of System lag on Unmanned Air System Internal Pilot Manual Landing 
Performance” by Lloyd, M. E., 2012. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Approach control was operationalized as airspeed and glideslope control on final 
approach. It was hypothesized that participants flying with in-cockpit AOA indication would be 
able to fly a more stable final approach than participants without in-cockpit AOA indication after 
failure of the airspeed indicator. The RMSE of airspeed and glideslope deviations for the final 
approach data was calculated for each participant and will initially be discussed separately in the 
descriptive analysis. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the RMSE of airspeed deviations of 
the two groups (AOA versus No-AOA). 
 
Table 2 
RMSE Descriptive Statistics for Airspeed Deviations (kts) 
Condition n 𝑋 SD Min. Max. 
AOA 16 1.32 1.10 0.26 3.46 
No-AOA 16 3.98 3.87 0 14.8 
 
 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the minimum value for RMSE in the No-AOA conditions is 0. This 
is because an airspeed range was given for participants to fly and one of the participants in the 
No-AOA group was able to fly the final approach exactly within those prescribed values. It can 
also be seen that the range of airspeed deviations was larger in the No-AOA group (14.8 kts) as 
opposed to the AOA group (3.2 kts). The maximum value of 3.46 kts for the AOA group, and 
14.8 kts for the No-AOA group, when compared to their respective means, suggests that the data 
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might be positively skewed. The boxplot shown in Figure 11 also supports the assumption that 
the data might be positively skewed. 
 
 
Figure 11. Boxplot of RMSE airspeed. 
 
 Skewness values were calculated using MINITAB’s b1 formula (Joanes & Gill, 1998). 
MINITAB’s b1 formula has been shown to generate the smallest mean-squared error in small 
samples that are normally distributed, when compared to other methods of calculating skewness 
(Joanes & Gill, 1998). Skewness values were found to be 0.88 in the AOA condition and 1.4 in 
the No-AOA condition respectively. Figure 11 shows the presence of an extreme score in the 
No-AOA group. A Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed suggests that the data for both groups are not 
following a normal distribution (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed. Data for the AOA group is presented in the left plot and 
data for the No-AOA group in the right plot. 
 
 To quantify departure from normality, a Shapiro-Wilk test was performed for both the 
AOA and No-AOA groups. The RMSE airspeed data in the AOA group were non-normal (W  = 
0.798, p = .003), as were the RMSE airspeed data in the No-AOA group (W = 0.825, p = .006). 
 In order to reduce skewness of the data and attempt to normalize the datasets, a 
logarithmic transformation was applied (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012; Howell, 2012). Because the 
data included a value that was 0, a constant of +1 was added to all airspeed RMSE data before 
performing the logarithmic transformation (Field et al., 2012; Howell, 2012). After 
transformation, the data were visually assessed again using Q-Q plots (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Q-Q plot of RMSE airspeed (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is presented 
in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot. 
 
The resulting boxplot of the transformed RMSE airspeed data can be seen in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Boxplot of RMSE airspeed (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is presented 
in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot. 
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 By visual inspection of Figures 13 and 14, it can be deducted that skewness has been 
reduced and extreme scores have been eliminated. The calculated skewness values are reduced to 
0.61 for the AOA group, and -0.04 for the No-AOA group respectively. Results from the 
Shapiro-Wilk test performed on the transformed data suggest data from the No-AOA group to be 
normally distributed (W = 0.971, p = .853). The Shapiro-Wilk test still indicates non-normality 
for the data from the AOA group (W = 0.866, p = .023). However, when comparing Q-Q plots 
(Figures 12 and 13) it can be seen that the distribution of data in the AOA group improved after 
transformation in terms of approaching normality. 
 An additional measure used to assess the overall stability of the final approach was the 
RMSE of glideslope deviations. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
RMSE Descriptive Statistics for Glideslope Deviations (ft) 
Condition n 𝑋 SD Min. Max. 
AOA 16 17.04 17.86 0.64 58.73 
No-AOA 16 24.39 17.59 3.95 65.46 
 
 
 
 In contrast to the RMSE of airspeed deviations, the RMSE of glideslope deviations does 
not show a floor effect. The lowest value is 0.64 ft, indicating that none of the participants were 
able to fly along the glideslope exactly within prescribed PAPI limits at all times. Again, the 
maximum values, when compared to their respective means, suggest a possible positive skew to 
the data. A boxplot for the data had been generated (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Boxplot of RMSE glideslope. 
  
 Figure 16 supports the existence of a positive skew to the data and shows the presence of 
an extreme score. Skewness values were found to be 1.00 in the AOA, and 0.93 in the No-AOA 
condition. Q-Q plots were generated for the data (see Figure 16). 
 
  
Figure 16. Q-Q plot of RMSE glideslope. Data for the AOA group is presented in the left plot 
and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot. 
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 A Shapiro-Wilk test performed on the RMSE glideslope data indicated non-normality for 
both datasets (AOA group: W = 0.834, p = .008; No-AOA group: W = 0.869, p = .026). Thus, a 
logarithmic transformation was applied to the glideslope data as well. This time, no constant was 
added because the smallest value was greater than 0 in both datasets (RMSE AOA and RMSE 
No-AOA). After transformation, the data were again inspected for normality (Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17. Q-Q plot of RMSE glideslope (transformed data). Data for the AOA group is 
presented in the left plot and data for the No-AOA group in the right plot. 
 
 The Q-Q plot in Figure 17 supports the assumption that, after logarithmic transformation, 
the data is more normal than before the transformation was applied. Skewness values are now 
reported at -0.28 in the AOA, and -0.15 in the No-AOA condition. Furthermore, results by the 
Shapiro-Wilk test indicate normality of the transformed data (AOA group: W = 0.943, p = .393; 
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No-AOA group: W = 0.970, p = .845). The resulting boxplot, shown in Figure 18, further 
supports these assumptions and shows that the extreme score has been eliminated. 
 
 
Figure 18. Boxplot of RMSE glideslope (transformed data). 
 
 
Figure 19. Mean values of RMSE airspeed and RMSE glideslope. Data for RMSE airspeed is 
presented in the left plot and data for RMSE glideslope in the right plot. 
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 Figure 19 shows the means of untransformed data. Confidence intervals are deliberately 
not displayed because they do not represent an accurate estimation if derived from skewed data 
in combination with small sample sizes. Figure 20 shows bar charts for the transformed data with 
the respective 95% confidence intervals. The relatively large confidence interval for RMSE 
glideslope in the AOA condition is discussed in the Discussions, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations chapter. 
 
 
Figure 20. Mean values of RMSE airspeed and RMSE glideslope (transformed data). Error bars 
represent a 95% confidence interval. Data for RMSE airspeed is presented in the left plot and 
data for RMSE glideslope in the right plot. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to determine if there is a 
difference in groups (AOA versus No-AOA) for the dependent variables RMSE airspeed and 
RMSE glideslope. The test was followed-up with two separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
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All tests were performed using the transformed data. The descriptive statistics for the 
transformed data can be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for the Log-Transformed Data 
Measure Condition n 𝑋 SD Min. Max. 
Log RMSE Airspeed 
AOA 16 0.75 0.43 0.23 1.50 
No-AOA 16 1.35 0.74 0 2.76 
Log RMSE Glideslope 
AOA 16 2.15 1.36 -0.44 4.07 
No-AOA 16 2.95 0.74 1.37 4.18 
 
Note. The airspeed data represents the log-transformed data after the constant +1 had been added. 
 
 
 
 The assumptions for a MANOVA and ANOVA were tested using the transformed data. 
Assumptions for a MANOVA are independence of the observations, random sampling, 
multivariate normality, and homogeneity of covariance matrices (Field et al., 2012). The former 
two assumptions were met by the research design. In addition, homogeneity of variance was 
tested for both dependent measures in order to test this assumption for the follow-up ANOVAs 
that were performed. 
 Multivariate normality. To test for multivariate normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
multivariate normality was performed. In the case of the transformed RMSE airspeed data, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of multivariate normality indicated that multivariate normality can be assumed 
(W = 0.947, p  = .446). The same is true for the transformed RMSE glideslope data (W = 0.968, p 
= .808). 
 Homogeneity of variance. Homogeneity of variance was assessed using Levene’s test of 
equality of error variances. The test revealed that sample variances in transformed RMSE 
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airspeed data did not differ in the AOA and No-AOA groups, F(1, 30) = 2.212, p = .147. Thus, 
for the airspeed data, homogeneity of variance can be assumed. However, when applied to the 
transformed RMSE glideslope data, the test revealed a difference between sample variances, F(1, 
30) = 8.225, p = .007, indicating that homogeneity for this data cannot be assumed. The ANOVA 
is considered a robust test concerning the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
(Howell, 2012). As such, the results of the ANOVA will still provide valid results, even when 
the assumption is violated, as is the case of the transformed RMSE glideslope data. 
 Homogeneity of covariance matrices. Homogeneity of covariance matrices was tested 
by submitting the transformed data to Box’s M. Box’s M produced significant results at p = .003 
indicating that the covariance matrices are unequal. However, Box’s M is highly susceptible to 
deviations from multivariate normality (Field et al., 2012). In any case, the Hotelling’s Trace 
statistic is robust to violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variances when sample sizes 
are equal (Field et al., 2012; Howell, 2012). 
 MANOVA and follow-up results. Using Hotelling’s Trace statistic, a significant effect 
of airspeed RMSE and glideslope RMSE was found for group (AOA versus No-AOA), T = 
0.275, F(2, 29) = 3.991, p = .029, η2 = .216. Univariate ANOVAs of the dependent measures 
also revealed an effect of group. Participants in the AOA group produced lower airspeed 
deviations than participants in the No-AOA group, F(1, 30) = 7.930, p = .009, η2 = .209. In 
addition, participants in the AOA group produced less glideslope deviation than participants in 
the No-AOA group, F(1, 30) = 4.228, p = .049, η2 = .124. The hypothesis that pilots flying with 
in-cockpit AOA indications are able to fly a more stable approach than pilots flying without 
AOA indications in the event of an airspeed indicator malfunction is supported. 
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 Time until airspeed indicator malfunction was noticed. Participants were instructed to 
press a button on the yoke when they noticed any malfunction during the experimental trials. 
During the actual experiment, most of the participants who noticed a malfunction forgot to press 
the button and some of them, as discussed later, did not notice any malfunction even though the 
airspeed indicator was frozen at 70 kts. As such, this measure did not produce required data for 
analysis and the hypothesis that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication are able to identify 
an airspeed indicator malfunction earlier than pilots flying without AOA information could not 
be tested. However, additional measures provided further insight into the effectiveness of AOA 
indications and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Correlation Between Flight Hours and the Dependent Variables 
 In the Methods chapter, it was noted that the difference in mean flight hours of 
participants in the two groups (𝑋 = 1114.69 hrs in the AOA group, 𝑋 = 368.00 hrs in the No-
AOA group) was relatively large. The correlation between flight hours and the dependent 
variables (airspeed RMSE and glideslope RMSE) was assessed to determine if the difference in 
flight hours biased the outcome of the experiment. A Mann-Whitney U test was performed on 
flight hours to determine if flight hours were significantly different between the two groups. The 
Mann-Whitney U statistic was not significant, supporting the null hypothesis that the distribution 
of flight hours is the same across both conditions (AOA versus No-AOA), p = .809. 
Furthermore, scatterplots of the data were generated to visually inspect the relationship of flight 
hours with the dependent variables airspeed (shown in Figure 21) and glideslope (shown in 
Figure 22) deviations.  
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Figure 21. Scatterplots of flight hours plotted against RMSE airspeed for the AOA group (left) 
and the No-AOA group (right). 
 
 
Figure 22. Scatterplots of flight hours plotted against RMSE glideslope for the AOA group (left) 
and the No-AOA group (right). 
 
 Both Figure 21 and Figure 22 suggest the absence of a relationship between flight hours 
and performance measures. In order to quantitatively evaluate the relationship, correlation 
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coefficients were computed. Flight hours do not have a normal distribution and could not be 
normalized through transformation. Due to the non-normal distribution of one variable, the non-
parametric Spearman correlation coefficient was computed. The coefficients and associated 
probability values are presented in Table 5 and indicate that none of the relationships are 
significant at p < .05. 
 
Table 5 
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (rs) for the Relationships between Participant Flight Hours 
and Performance Measures 
 
Correlation of Flight Hours by rs p 
Airspeed RMSE (AOA group) .384 .142 
Airspeed RMSE (No-AOA group) -.017 .928 
Glideslope RMSE (AOA group) .445 .084 
Glideslope RMSE (No-AOA group) -.179 .506 
 
Note. The assumed null hypothesis is that there is no linear relationship. 
 
 
Additional Measures 
 Stall warning horn activation during flight. The number of occasions on which 
participants let the aircraft come close to a stall after the airspeed indicator failed was examined. 
Data from the beginning to the end of data recording were examined for activation of the stall 
warning horn. Results indicate that, in the AOA group, only 2 out of 16 participants, or 12.5%, 
let the airspeed decline all the way to the activation of the stall warning horn. However, in the 
No-AOA group, 8 out of 16 participants, or 50%, let the airspeed decline to the point at which 
the stall warning horn was activated. In order to determine whether activation of the stall 
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warning was contingent on the experimental condition that the participants were in, Pearson’s 
Chi Square was calculated. The corresponding 2x2 contingency table can be found in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Contingency Table (Stall Warning Horn Activation in the AOA versus No-AOA Condition) 
 Stall Warning Total 
Condition Yes No  
AOA 2 (5) 14 (11) 16 
No-AOA 8 (5) 8 (11) 16 
Total 10 22 32 
 
Note. Expected frequencies if condition and stall warning horn activation were independent of 
each other are listed in parentheses. 
 
 
 The resulting 𝜒!! = 5.236 was statistically significant at p = .022. This indicates that stall 
warning horn activation and the condition that the participants were in (AOA versus No-AOA) 
were related. In this particular case, as noted above, in the No-AOA group more participants let 
the airspeed decline to the stall warning than in the AOA group. A more detailed analysis reveals 
that some of the participants let the airspeed decline on more than one occasion to a point at 
which the stall warning horn activated. Table 7 shows the number of distinct occasions on which 
the stall warning activated by participant and group. 
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Table 7 
Number of Stall Warning Horn Activations by Participant 
Condition 
AOAa No-AOAa 
- - 
2 1 
- 2 
- - 
- - 
- 1 
- - 
1 - 
- 4 
- 1 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- 4 
- 1 
- 3 
 
Note. For ease of readability, a dash is displayed if there was no stall warning horn activation. 
an = 16. 
 
 Identification of the malfunction. Immediately after the experimental trial during which 
the airspeed indicator malfunction was induced, participants were asked if they had noticed any 
malfunction during the final approach. Fewer participants in the AOA group than in the No-
AOA group identified the airspeed indicator malfunction correctly. In the AOA group, 10 out of 
16, or 62.5%, of the participants identified the airspeed indicator malfunction. In the No-AOA 
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group, 14 out of 16, or 87.5%, of the participants were aware that the airspeed indicator had 
malfunctioned. The data were plotted in a 2x2 contingency table and can be found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Contingency Table (Correct Identification of the Malfunction in the AOA versus No-AOA 
Condition) 
 
 Identified Malfunction Total 
Condition Yes No  
AOA 10 (12) 6 (4) 16 
No-AOA 14 (12) 2 (4) 16 
Total 24 8 32 
 
Note. Expected frequencies if condition and correct identification of the malfunction were 
independent of each other are listed in parentheses. 
 
 
 Due to the fact that the expected frequencies of two cells in Table 8 had an expected 
count of less than five, Fisher’s Exact Test was used instead of Pearson’s Chi Square (Howell, 
2008) to test the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. Fisher’s Exact Test was 
non-significant, p = .22 and it can be concluded that the condition that the participants were in 
(AOA versus No-AOA) was independent of whether they identified the malfunction correctly or 
not.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overall, this experiment showed that pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication were 
able to fly a more stable final approach than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication 
when confronted with an airspeed indicator malfunction. Furthermore, 8 out of 16 participants in 
the No-AOA condition allowed the aircraft to come too close to a stall during final approach, 
indicated by the activation of the aircraft’s stall warning horn. This only happened to 2 out of 16 
participants in the AOA condition, suggesting that participants in the AOA condition not only 
flew a more stable approach but also a safer approach than participants in the No-AOA 
condition. These findings support the effort of educating GA pilots about AOA and the push for 
installation of AOA devices in GA aircraft (e.g., FAA, 2012; GAJSC, 2012; Hirschman, 2012).  
The results of the experiment further indicated that a device such as an AOA indicator 
may be useful after just a short training period, albeit the fact that the full potential might not 
have been understood by the pilots. The short training period, however, should not be understood 
as sufficient to train pilots on the usage of AOA indicators. The AOA indicator develops its full 
potential only after the concept is well understood and proficiency in using the indicator has been 
acquired. Therefore, it would be interesting to see what kind of results would be obtained if the 
study would be replicated using pilots who are already experienced with flying with an AOA 
indicator. It is assumed by the researcher that results would become stronger and more uniform 
in the AOA condition. Not all pilots in GA have experience with flying with AOA indications. 
While it could be argued that maybe military pilots who are experienced in flying with AOA 
indicators might be used for such a study, it is doubtful that the results could be generalized to 
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the GA community due to the fact that military and GA pilots arguably present different 
populations.  
Effect Sizes, Confidence Intervals, and Possible Confounds 
 The study produced relatively small effect sizes, indicating that there might have been 
other variables that influenced performance. In addition, confidence intervals for airspeed and 
glideslope deviations were relatively large. In general, it can be assumed that once research 
moves from basic to applied research, there will always be more confounding variables to deal 
with and effort must be taken to identify these. Possible confounds are now further discussed. 
 The experiment used flight simulation with a generic Cessna 172 cockpit layout and 
relatively primitive controls lacking feedback about the actual forces that would act on the 
control yoke during actual flight. In addition, trim for the aircraft had to be established using 
buttons on the yoke, as opposed to a control wheel in a real Cessna 172. It might have been that 
some participants were able to adjust to these conditions better than others. In addition, in recent 
years, more and more pilots are solely trained in technologically advanced cockpits, also referred 
to as glass-cockpits. Thus, when presented with standard instrumentation, the adaption time of 
those pilots may vary.  
 During the experiment and interviews with the pilots, it was observed that some of the 
pilots were able to adopt different strategies of controlling airspeed in the absence of airspeed 
information. Some of the pilots seemed to utilize visual pitch pictures, known power-settings, 
and vertical velocity indications. The varying headwind that was introduced in the experimental 
trials, albeit a much stronger headwind than used in the practice approaches, might not have been 
enough to render unusable certain “techniques” pilots use to control airspeed in the absence of 
airspeed information. Methods can be utilized in future research to minimize the use of these 
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techniques. For example, the final approach segment could be flown without visual references in 
a setting that would require participants to fly a precision instrument approach, although this 
would limit the participants to instrument-rated pilots only. While this would reduce the 
possibility of using visual pitch pictures, pitch can nevertheless still be set on the attitude 
indicator. In addition, other instruments such as the vertical velocity indicator cannot be taken 
away from the instrumentation as the setting would progressively become more and more 
unrealistic.  
 The question is whether it is even desired to negate the effects of techniques used by 
certain pilots because the goal is to establish the usage of AOA indication as a secondary source 
to already tried and tested concepts such as pitch and power. The effects of already established 
techniques might vary from pilot to pilot but it will be difficult, if not impossible and undesired, 
to isolate these effects. 
Motivational Effects 
 Motivation effects might have biased the outcome of the experiment. It was noticed that 
participants flying with an AOA indicator were visibly hyped about the fact that they got to 
experience a new instrument. AOA indicators are common for military aircraft, especially for 
fighter-type airplanes. Some participants remembered seeing AOA indicators used for aircraft 
carrier landings. It could be argued that this provided strong motivational effects and a 
“coolness” factor that increased overall performance for participants in the AOA group. Further 
experiments could introduce another instrument to the control group that provides the same 
motivational factors, although it might be hard to find such an instrument. 
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Misconceptions 
Misconceptions about AOA were noticed in some participants while the training on the 
AOA indicator was given. Some pilots had previously heard about AOA indicators and were 
thinking that an AOA indicator would show indications about the glideslope. They thought for 
example that, if the downward pointing chevron illuminates on the AOA indicator, this would 
indicate that they are above the glideslope for final approach and had to descent. These 
misconceptions had to be eliminated during the training but might still have had some carryover 
effects to performance. This might contribute to the relatively large confidence interval evident 
in the RMSE glideslope data for the No-AOA group (see Figure 21). 
Floor Effect 
A floor effect in airspeed RMSE was due to the fact that the participants were given an 
airspeed range that could theoretically be flown without error. Interestingly, while not expected, 
one participant in the No-AOA condition was able to fly entirely within the desired airspeed 
range. This might have been purely due to luck or due to the fact that the participant was able to 
successfully employ one or more of the techniques described earlier in this chapter.  
Theoretically, such a floor effect might have also been present in the glideslope data due 
to the nature of the PAPIs having an allowable range for a 3° glideslope indication. One way to 
avoid a floor effect for the glideslope measure would be to have participants conduct an 
approach with the usage of an instrument landing system which again would limit the 
participants to instrument-rated pilots only. The possible drawbacks of limiting the sample do not 
seem to outweigh the benefits of guaranteeing a measure without floor effects. This is especially 
true considering the fact that a floor effect in the glideslope measure seems to be possible but 
unlikely. 
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In the case of airspeed indications, there is no way to eliminate floor effects when using 
the relatively intuitive AOA indicator that was used in this experiment. The AOA indicator has 
an allowable range that maps to optimum AOA for an approach. This range will always translate 
to a range of airspeed and never to an exact airspeed value. The only way to counter this effect 
would be to use a different AOA indicator. It is questionable, though, whether one would want to 
sacrifice the intuitiveness of an AOA indicator for the sole reason of being able to collect better 
data. In addition, the fact that only one participant was able to fly the whole approach within the 
desired airspeed range, producing an airspeed deviation of exactly zero, leads to the conclusion 
that this effect might not have impacted the overall findings. 
Stall Warning Findings 
It is interesting in itself that only 12.5% of participants in the AOA group let the airspeed 
decline to a point at which the stall warning became active, whereas in the No-AOA group 50% 
of participants experienced a stall warning. This further strengthens the finding that an AOA 
indicator increases overall safety of flying by warning the pilot of a high AOA, which, if allowed 
to increase, could lead to a stall. Participants in the AOA condition most likely recognized the 
red downward pointing chevron and the need to decrease the AOA before allowing the AOA to 
increase to a point at which the aircraft would be getting too close to a stall. It can thus be argued 
that an AOA indicator can increase the safety buffer surrounding a stall threshold if its 
indications are acted upon. 
Towards the Usage of AOA for GA 
Experiments of this kind are beneficial not only as a scientific contribution but also by 
increasing overall awareness of a problem. Comments from participants such as that they learned 
a lot during the experiment and an overall resulting favorable attitude towards AOA indication 
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indicate that they were eager to become more familiar with the overall concept of AOA 
instrumentation. “Getting the word out” to the pilots is the first step in making flying operations 
safer.  
In terms of safety, the findings of this experiment speak for themselves. This research has 
established the AOA indicator as an instrument that can enhance aerodynamic awareness and act 
as a backup instrument in the case of an airspeed indicator malfunction. As such, displaying 
AOA to the pilot enhances safety in the absence of reliable airspeed information in the cockpit. 
Other possible benefits should be evaluated in future research in order to provide further 
scientific contributions to a topic that is deemed of utmost importance to flight safety (e.g., FAA, 
2012; GAJSC, 2012).  
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APPENDIX B 
Informed Consent Form 
The effects of angle-of-attack indication on maintaining system resilience when confronted with 
an aircraft malfunction 
 
conducted by Claas-Tido Boesser 
Advisor: Dr. Neville 
College of Arts & Sciences 
Human Factors Department 
600 South Clyde Morris Blvd., Daytona Beach, FL, 32114 
 
 The experiment you are about to participate in is concerned with examining possible 
advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack (AOA) indications during flight. Specifically, 
the purpose is to evaluate the importance of providing pilots with feedback about fundamental 
aircraft aerodynamics during emergency situations and unexpected disturbances. The outcome of 
this study might help improve flight safety by providing insight into the effectiveness of AOA 
indicators. 
 The study consists of six practice approaches flown to Daytona Beach International 
Airport, followed by experimental trial approaches. During the experimental trial approaches you 
will be confronted with a possible malfunction. Depending on the group you are in (non-
AOA/AOA), all approaches will be performed with or without in-cockpit AOA indication. 
 The whole experiment will take no longer than one and a half hours and there are no 
known risks with this experiment. You will be compensated for this experiment with $20. You 
may terminate your participation at any time and will be paid for the time you have already 
completed. Your assistance will help us understand the effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA 
indication.  
 We will keep your personal records private and confidential. Any information collected 
during this session will only be used for scientific purposes. We may publish the results of this 
study. If we do, we will not include your name. We will not publish anything that would let 
people know who you are or how you are connected to this study.   
 Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the 
experiment or contact me at (940)-337-6455. If you have any questions or complaints that you 
might not want to address directly with me, you can contact my advisor at (386)-226-4922. 
 
Statement of consent 
 
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific purposes of the 
experiment and that I will receive a remuneration fee of $20 upon completion of the study.  
 
Participant’s name (please print):  _________________  
Signature of participant:   _________________ Date: _________ 
Experimenter:     _________________ Date: _________  
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APPENDIX C 
Demographics Form 
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. This form asks you about general 
demographic information and your piloting experience. We will use this information mainly to 
determine possible relationships between flight experience and experimental results. 
 
Please provide the following information 
 
1. Your age: 
 
 
2. Circle the certificate(s) you are holding: 
 
Private 
 
Commercial 
 
Airline Transport Pilot 
 
Flight Instructor 
 
 
3. Are you instrument-rated? 
 
Yes         No 
 
 
4. Approximate total number of flight hours: 
 
 
5. Of the total flight hours, approximately how many hours were flown in technologically 
advanced aircraft, i.e. “glass-cockpit”? 
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APPENDIX D 
Feedback for Participants of Angle-of-Attack Research 
Human Factors Department 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
 First of all, thank you for your participation in this experiment. The data recorded during 
this experiment will be of great value not only for my research but also for aviation safety. The 
experiment you have just completed will give more insight into possible advantageous effects of 
angle-of-attack (AOA) instrumentation. If you were part of the control group and did not get the 
opportunity to fly with an AOA indexer, please be assured that the data collected from your 
participation is of utmost importance in order to be able to make reasonable conclusions about 
differences between flying with or without AOA instrumentation. 
Effectiveness of in-cockpit AOA indication is assessed in this research by posing three 
distinct questions. First, will pilots flying a final approach with in-cockpit AOA indications 
notice a frozen airspeed indication earlier than pilots flying without AOA indication? Second, 
will pilots flying with in-cockpit AOA indication be able to fly an overall more stable approach 
than pilots without in-cockpit AOA indication after being confronted with an airspeed indicator 
malfunction? And finally, if there is a degradation of aircraft control due to airspeed indicator 
malfunction, will pilots with in-cockpit AOA indication be able to recover from such degradation 
quicker than pilots flying without in-cockpit AOA indication. Together, these three questions 
aim at providing a starting point for quantitative AOA effectiveness research. 
The Federal Aviation Administration underlines the importance of AOA and stall 
awareness and has just recently (August 2012) published Advisory Circular #120-109 (Stall and 
Stick Pusher Training) in the wake of related accidents. In addition, at the beginning of 2012, the 
FAA has declared the installation of certain AOA systems in GA aircraft as minor alterations 
requiring only a logbook entry instead of a full-up Form 337 installation approval process, thus 
facilitating the installation of such systems. The industry and experts agree that AOA 
information can be very beneficial to flight safety but there aren’t any studies that exclusively 
employ quantitative measures like the current experiment does. You have been an essential part 
of helping to fill this gap. We might see more AOA indicators in modern cockpits, maybe some 
retrofitting of existing airplanes and maybe you even find yourself flying with an AOA indicator 
soon. 
 
 
Allow me to ask you for one final favor:  
 
Because this experiment is built around the airspeed indicator malfunction, it will be of 
utmost importance that you do not talk to your friends or colleagues about the exact activities of 
the experiment, especially not about the malfunction being an airspeed indicator malfunction, 
otherwise the results of this experiment will end up being distorted. Please be considerate and 
help me conduct research that can be beneficial to aviation safety in the future. 
Should you wish to learn more about this research or have any other questions about the 
topic, please feel free to contact me at any time at boesserc@my.erau.edu. Thank you again for 
your participation. 
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APPENDIX E 
Experiment Script 
Before participant arrives: 
 -­‐ Load correct plane for condition -­‐ Check joystick in XPlane / set throttle idle -­‐ Check button mapping to 0 -­‐ Set weather: 10 kts headwind (lo-stratus 8000-8SM vis) -­‐ Clear all malfunctions -­‐ Press “s” and “key up” to setup view -­‐ Release brakes -­‐ Setup new folder with participant number and setup first approach 
 
When participant arrives: 
 -­‐ Welcome participant -­‐ Participant reads and signs informed consent -­‐ Participant receives $20 and signs Participant Verification Form -­‐ Participant fills out demographic worksheet 
 -­‐ “Thank you, this is a script I read to every participant” 
 -­‐ “The experiment you are about to participate in is concerned with examining possible 
advantageous effects of in-cockpit angle-of-attack (AOA) indications during flight.” 
 -­‐ “The study consists of six practice approaches flown to Daytona Beach International 
Airport, followed by experimental trial approaches. During the experimental trial 
approaches you will be confronted with a possible malfunction. Depending on the group 
you are in (non-AOA/AOA), all approaches will be performed with or without in-cockpit 
AOA indication.” 
 -­‐ “You will conduct 3 practice trials to familiarize yourself with the AOA indicator, 
followed by 3 practice trials to fly stabilized approaches” 
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-­‐ “Following the practice trials, you will fly experimental trials with different headwind 
settings and a encounter a possible malfunction” 
 -­‐ “The simulation starts with the aircraft located on a 3NM final Runway 34 at Daytona 
Beach, on glideslope, about 90 knots, 10 knots headwind” 
 -­‐ “Your task is as follows in order: 
o Maintain a 3 degree glideslope using the PAPIs and directional alignment with the 
centerline 
o Slowdown to 60-65 knots as quickly as possible for a no-flap straight-in 
o Fly a stabilized approach with a 3 degree glideslope and at 60-65 knots 
o If malfunction is encountered, continue to fly approach as stable as possible 
o The simulator will freeze before touchdown 
 -­‐ Explain the following 
o Brake light normal 
o Stall warning 
o Explain controls and Trim 
o Explain throttle movement at beginning of simulation 
 -­‐ Introduce procedure when resetting computer 
 -­‐ Show AOA presentation 
 -­‐ Any questions? 
 
Practice Trials -­‐ Setup for 6 trials combined -­‐ After each, check throttle idle 
 
Experimental Trials -­‐ Inform participant about wind conditions -­‐ Inform participant about possible malfunction and which button to press -­‐ Inform participant not to break off approach “continue to fly as smooth as possible” -­‐ First trial, set headwind to 30 knots 
- Hack clock -­‐ Third trial, choose Approach with ASI Failure and set headwind to 25 knots 
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After the experiment 
-  Handout post-flight questionnaire -­‐ Handout debriefing form 
 -­‐ Save participant data to USB stick and Laptop -­‐ Write participant number on all sheets 
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APPENDIX F 
PowerPoint Slides Used for Training Participants on Angle-of-Attack 
 
Slide 1. Illustrating relationships between AOA, centerline of the aircraft, and actual flight path. 
Adapted from “A Search for Meaning: A Case Study of the Approach-to-Landing” by Flach et 
al., 2003. 
 
 
Slide 2. Critical angle of attack and stall. Adapted from “The Airplane Flying Handbook” by the 
Federal Aviation Administration, 2004, p. 4-3. 
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Slide 3. Different possible indications of the AOA indicator. Screenshots taken from X-Plane by 
Laminar Research. 
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Appendix G 
Excerpt from Excel Data Generated by the Plugin for X-Plane 
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